The seizure of the “Al-Sharwa” ship is a significant step in combating illegal arms smuggling. The National Resistance Forces continue to operate resolutely, in collaboration with the international community, to thwart activities that endanger regional security.
**Translation to English:**
The seizure of the ship “Al-Sharwa” by Yemen’s National Resistance Forces recently revealed disturbing details about a sophisticated Iranian-managed smuggling network, operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah, aimed at supplying the Houthi militia in Yemen with advanced weapons, including sensitive chemical materials for the production of missiles and drones. On board the ship, 750 tons of strategic weapons were seized, highlighting the scale of this illicit activity.
**Structure and Operatives of the Network:**
According to video and audio confessions from the crew, the network involved seven operatives. Four of them—Amar Ahmed Yahya Masawi, Ali Ahmed Abdo Qusair, Issa Ahmed Abdo Qusair, and Abdullah Mohammed Maqbool Afifi—underwent direct training in Iran under IRGC supervision. They led shipments from the port of Bandar Abbas in Iran to the port of Al-Salif in Hodeidah, Yemen, including high-risk chemical materials. Their activities also included coordination with an Iranian ship anchored off the coast of Somalia. The other three operatives—Mohammed Abdo Talhi, Mohammed Suleiman Majaji, and Ashraf Bakri Ahmed Zain Abdullah—managed a separate smuggling route through Djibouti, using the cover of legitimate commercial activity.
**Recruitment and Training:**
The operatives were recruited by the Houthi militia, exploiting their economic hardships. They were transported through sophisticated routes: flights from Sana’a to Jordan, then to Lebanon with Hezbollah’s assistance, and subsequently to Syria and Tehran. An alternative route passed through Oman. In Iran, they underwent training in IRGC-supervised camps under the command of Mohammad Jafar Al-Talabi, before being transferred to smaller training facilities in Bandar Abbas.
**Smuggling Routes:**
The network operated through three main routes:
1. **Direct Route**: From Bandar Abbas to the port of Al-Salif in Yemen.
2. **Somali Route**: Using high-speed boats operated by the IRGC, connected to a mother ship off the Somali coast.
3. **Commercial Route**: Through Djibouti, disguising shipments as legitimate trade.
**Smuggling Methods:**
The crew admitted to using temperature-controlled refrigeration containers to transport sensitive chemical materials, such as hydrazine and liquid nitrogen, used in the production of advanced weapons. The seized shipment, which was the network’s 12th operation, was disguised as industrial equipment (generators, transformers, and air pumps) but included disassembled missiles, drones, air defense systems, and radars. The smugglers revealed they avoided international maritime patrols in the Bab al-Mandab Strait by navigating at night west of the international corridor, close to Eritrea’s coast.
**Network Leaders:**
Confessions identified Houthi commanders coordinating the smuggling in Hodeidah: Hussi Hamed Hamza Mohsen Al-Atas, Mohammed Darham Qasim Al-Muayyad (known as “Ibrahim Al-Muayyad”), Yahya Mohammed Hassan Qasim Al-Iraqi (known as “Yahya Jinnah”), and Faisal Ahmed Jalib Al-Hamzi.
**Debunking Houthi Claims:**
The crew mocked Houthi claims of “local military production,” confirming that all seized weapons originated from Iran or transit stations in Somalia and Djibouti, denying any independent manufacturing capability by the militia.
The seizure of “Al-Sharwa” exposes the extent of Iran’s efforts to supply the Houthis with advanced weapons through sophisticated smuggling networks and close cooperation with Hezbollah. The seized chemical materials raise significant concerns about the Houthis’ weapons production capabilities, which could threaten regional stability. This activity underscores the need for enhanced international maritime monitoring and patrols in the region.